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(Re-) imagining the ‘Self’ of Ontological Security: The 
Case of Brazil’s Ambivalent Postcolonial Subjectivity 
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Abstract 
In this article, I critically engage with and develop an alternative 
approach to ontological security informed by Jacques Lacan’s theory 
of the subject. I argue that ontological security relates to a lack; that 
is, the always-frustrated desire to provide meaningful discursive 
interpretations to one’s self. This lack is generative of anxiety which 
functions as the subject’s affective and necessary drive to a 
continuous, albeit elusive, pursuit of self-coherence. I theorise 
subjectivity in Lacanian terms as fantasised discursive articulations of 
the Self in relation to an idealised mirror-image other. The focus on 
postcolonial states’ subjectivity allows for the examination of the 
anxiety-driven lack generated by the ever-present desire to emulate 
but also resist the ‘ego-ideal’1 represented by the Western other. I 
propose, therefore, to explore the theoretical assertion that 
postcolonial ontological security refers to the institutionalisation and 
discursive articulation of enduring and anxiety-driven affective traces 
related to these states’ colonial pasts that are still active and 
influence current foreign policy practices. I illustrate the force of this 
interpretation of ontological security by focusing on Brazil as an 
example of a postcolonial state coping with the lack caused by its 
ambivalent/hybrid self-identity.  
                                                 
I am grateful to the Centre of International Relations (CPDOC) of the Getúlio 
Vargas Foundation (FGV) for its generous institutional support while conducting 
research in Rio de Janeiro. I am also thankful to Simona Manea, Alexandre 
Moreli, Catarina Kinnvall, Jennifer Mitzen, John Cash, Nicholas Wheeler and 
Adam Quinn for their useful suggestions during the process of writing this article. 
I am especially grateful to the editors of Millennium and the anonymous 
reviewers for their insightful and detailed comments. This research received no 
specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit 
sectors.  
1 Lorenzo Chiesa, Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan 
(Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT press, 2007), 24. 
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Introduction 
 
In this article, I critically engage with and develop an alternative 
approach to ontological security informed by Jacques Lacan’s theory 
of the subject. I argue that ontological security relates to a ‘lack’; that 
is, the always-frustrated desire to provide meaningful discursive 
interpretations to one’s Self. This lack is generative of anxiety which 
functions as the subject’s affective and necessary drive to a 
continuous, albeit elusive, pursuit of self-coherence. In this sense, I 
theorise ontological security in Lacanian terms as fantasised 
interpretations of the Self in relation to an idealised mirror-image 
other.  
I am interested in the subjectivity of postcolonial states because 
of their ambivalent/hybrid self-understandings as members of an 
international society still dominated by the cultural values and identity 
markers associated with Western coloniality, in which colonised 
peoples were perceived as inferior and in need of permanent 
tutelage.2 I propose, therefore, to explore the theoretical assertion 
that the ontological security of postcolonial states is the result of the 
institutionalisation and discursive articulation of enduring and anxiety-
driven affective traces related to these states’ colonial pasts that are 
still active and influence current foreign policy practices. This core 
theoretical claim is intended as a heuristic device to empirically 
examine the single case of Brazil. However, I believe it could be 
productively expanded to the examination of a considerable number 
of other postcolonial and non-Western states. 
In her seminal book, Ayşe Zarakol has persuasively argued that 
societies in three non-Western states, Turkey, Japan and Russia, are 
psychologically driven by a shared sense of ontological insecurity 
resulting from a historically situated process of international 
                                                 
2 On the notion of coloniality, see, for example, Anibal Quijano, ‘Coloniality of 
Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America’, International Sociology 15, n. 2 
(2000): 215-232 and Walter Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, 
Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2000). 
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stigmatisation.3 She draws together the notions of ‘stigma’ and 
‘modernity’ as the dominant cultural, social and material criteria of 
civilization and progress that have historically established a 
hierarchical international order of ‘superior’ insiders and ‘stigmatised’ 
outsiders.4 As a critical elaboration on Zarakol’s original insight, in 
this article I aim to further theorise and empirically investigate the 
psychological residual effects, at the state level, of what she has 
astutely identified, at the structural/symbolic level, as the ‘larger 
normative context of international stigmatisation’.5 
Yet, my conceptualisation of postcolonial ontological (in-
)security is primarily entangled with the signifier of race, which I take 
as the key ordering principle of ‘coloniality’ rather than ‘modernity’. In 
my view, the established/outsider dynamic of stigmatisation 
delineated by Zarakol does not sufficiently incorporate the 
international racial hierarchies that have profoundly shaped the 
psyche of postcolonial states.6 Furthermore, unlike her empirical 
interest in former non-Western empires, I engage here with the 
subjectivity of postcolonial states that have experienced direct and 
sustained colonial domination by Western European powers. I focus 
the analysis on the emotional trauma resulting from the unique 
condition of colonial subjugation which, notwithstanding some very 
interesting parallels, is significantly different from Zarakol’s 
conceptual discussion of the stigma associated with defeat and the 
loss of empire by Turkey, Japan and Russia.  
The present study’s focus on ontological security is due to 
being originally an approach grounded in psychoanalysis, therefore 
theoretically equipped to deal with questions regarding the link 
between the affective and discursive dimensions of subjectivity. 
Interestingly, however, this link has been largely neglected in most of 
the ontological security literature in IR.7  Therefore, by taking a 
                                                 
3 Ayşe Zarakol, After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
4 Ibid., 54. 
5 Ibid., 57. 
6 Zarakol applies Nobert Elias’ established/outsider distinction to explain how 
‘established’ Western states make non-Western states feel as if they were 
‘outsiders’, leading to self-stigmatisation. Ibid., 10-11.      
7 Important exceptions include, Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Badredine Arfi, ‘Fantasy in the 
Discourse of Social Theory of International Politics’, Cooperation and Conflict 45, 
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Lacanian approach to ontological security, my contribution is to unfold 
a productive and unexplored path to the examination of subjects’ 
emotional attachments to particular self-identifications, which is also 
an important gap in the IR literature on social constructivism.8  
The analytical focus is on the historically situated affective 
sources and discursive processes of identity construction among 
elites who claim to speak on behalf of the Brazilian state and who are 
placed in dominant ‘subject-positions’9 within its institutional foreign 
policy apparatus. Following a process of bureaucratic consolidation 
initiated in the 1930s, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (commonly 
known as Itamaraty) gradually became, and still currently is, the 
dominant institutional framework for the production and socialisation 
of Brazil’s international autobiographical narratives.10 According to 
Janice Bially Mattern, political actors’ attempts to rhetorically lock-in 
and perpetuate existing identities are a form of ‘power enacted 
through the narrative gun’.11 The case of Brazil is noteworthy 
because of the diplomatic elites’ autonomy to construct and enact the 
‘narrative guns’ of foreign policy making. These have creatively 
articulated a hybrid postcolonial self-understanding, merging Western 
and non-Western identity markers, yet favouring the former, as the 
significant desired other.  
Inspired by Pierre Bourdieu’s critical sociology, I assume the 
state not as a unitary and reified entity but, instead, as historically 
constituted by dynamic relations between multiple fields of socialised 
                                                                                                                                                 
n. 4 (2010): 428-48, Charlotte Epstein ‘Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and 
the Study of Identity in International Politics’, European Journal of International 
Relations, 17, n. 2 (2011): 327-50, Ty Solomon, The Politics of Subjectivity in 
American Foreign Policy Discourses (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2015).  
8 For a still up-to-date critical assessment of constructivist attempts to integrate 
emotional phenomena into IR, see Andrew A. Ross, ‘Coming in from the Cold: 
Constructivism and Emotions’, European Journal of International Relations 12, n. 
2 (2006): 197–222. 
9 Epstein, ‘Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in 
International Politics’, 328.  
10 Brent Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and 
the IR State (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). 
11 Janice Bially Mattern, ‘The Power Politics of Identity’, European Journal of 
International Relations 7, n. 3 (2001), 352.  
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subjectivities and ‘habituated practices’.12 Brazil’s foreign policy 
establishment could be understood as one such ‘dominant field’ of 
the Brazilian state’s institutional apparatus. In this regard, it is 
important to clarify that, according to the ontological position taken 
here, states possess emotional/psychological properties only insofar 
as collective affective experiences of individuals have been 
discursively articulated, codified and routinised into social/institutional 
structures of the state and the concurrent foreign policy practices of 
governments. The continuity assumption relates to the residual 
affective dimension (or subconscious drivers), which I argue have 
significantly influenced Brazil’s journey of self-understanding as an 
independent national formation. My argument theoretically assumes 
that the anxiety-laden condition of colonisation has left profound 
traces in the postcolonial subject’s consciousness, which have been 
articulated into foreign policy discourses past and present.13      
The method used here is based on the re-organisation and re-
interpretation of a well-documented vocabulary uttered by foreign 
policy elites and intellectuals since independence to describe Brazil’s 
postcolonial national ethos; but one that is incorporated into a 
rigorously discussed theoretical framework. This methodological 
approach is intended to contribute to the critique and further 
development of ontological security theory in conjunction to an 
empirically grounded interpretation of postcolonial subjectivity. In this 
sense, historical evidence of Brazil is introduced to illustrate the 
article’s core theoretical assumptions and to support the plausibility of 
the theoretical approach offered.  
I begin with a theoretical/conceptual exploration of the 
relationship between emotion, subjectivity and ontological security. I 
take a Lacanian approach to subjectivity, largely in terms of his 
                                                 
12 By adopting Pierre Bourdieu’s interpretation of habitus and the field, I avoid in 
this article a discussion of state’s personhood and the agency-structure 
dichotomy. For well-established examples of this ontological position in the 
discipline of International Relations (IR), see Vincent Pouliot, ‘The Logic of 
Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities’. International 
Organization 62, n. 2 (2008): 257–288, Didier Bigo, ‘Pierre Bourdieu and 
International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of Power’, International 
Political Sociology 5, n. 3 (2011): 225–258 and Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Bourdieu 
in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2013).          
13 Vivienne Jabri, The Postcolonial Subject: Claiming Politics/Governing Others in 
Late Modernity (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 5. 
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conceptualisation of ‘anxiety’, ‘lack’ and the ‘mirror stage’ in the 
subject’s psychic development, as a way to conceive an original 
interpretation of ontological security. Then, I offer a theoretical 
reconstruction of postcolonial subjectivity centred on 
ambivalence/hybridity between being and not being Western/modern. 
I suggest that this largely affect-induced ambivalence has been 
discursively translated into postcolonial states’ self-biographical 
narratives and embedded into foreign policy. Finally, I illustrate the 
force of this reinterpretation of ontological security by focusing on 
Brazil as an example of a postcolonial state coping with the 
ontological anxiety caused by its hybrid postcolonial subjectivity.           
 
What does emotion mean to ontological security? 
 
An increasing number of scholars have been concerned with the role 
of emotions in international relations. The scholarly interest in 
emotions has led to important theoretical inroads in arguing, for 
example, that emotions are constitutive of identities14, cognitive 
beliefs and a necessary element of rationality.15 Most empirical 
analyses and theoretical/conceptual engagements have focused on 
the role emotions play in terms of actors’ reactions to (and 
interpretations of) international events. In the ontological security 
literature, emotions have also taken centre stage in empirical 
descriptions of individuals’ and groups’ lacking of a stable sense of 
self, leading, for example, to emotional distress and ontological 
anxiety. 
Yet, emotion has no explicit function or independent ontological 
status in theoretical treatments of ontological security in the IR 
literature. In particular, ontological security authors, notwithstanding 
the framework’s origins in psychoanalytical theory, have largely 
neglected Lacan’s seminal view on the emotional appeal of discursive 
signifiers, which he understood as continually failing attempts of 
stabilising one’s Self. Through a Lacanian lens, therefore, I believe 
one can unfold a productive and unexplored path to the examination 
of subjects’ dynamic attachments to particular self-identifications.    
                                                 
14 Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, ‘Theorizing Emotions in World Politics’, 
International Theory 6, n. 3 (2014): 491-514. 
15 Jonathan Mercer, ‘Human Nature and the First Image: Emotion in International 
Politics’,  Journal of International Relations and Development 9 (2006):288-303. 
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Ontological security approaches to international relations 
largely draw on Ronald David Laing’s original insight in 
psychoanalysis16, and Anthony Giddens’ later usage of the term in his 
social theory of structuration, which claim that individuals need stable 
self-conceptions and are attached to daily routines as a way to deal 
with uncertainty in their lives.17 These everyday practices function as 
psychological antidotes enabling meaningful agency and self-
understanding in the face of otherwise unbearable existential 
anxieties. In the conventional sense, therefore, ontological security 
relates, to the individuals’ psychological ability to sustain a coherent 
and continuous sense of who they are. 
Unlike Laing’s focus on individual psychology, Giddens’ 
contribution was to more clearly establish the intersubjective link 
between self-reflective individuals and the social structures they 
produce and participate in. These social structures are constitutive of 
shared conventions and social attitudes/norms which individuals need 
to rely upon in order to sustain their ontological security. He argues 
that ‘what makes a given response ‘appropriate’ or ‘acceptable’ 
necessitates a shared – but unproven and unprovable – framework of 
reality’.18 The framework of reality, or social structure, engenders 
‘basic trust’, which, in turn, allows individuals to coherently perform 
tasks, make decisions and also consciously reflect upon the 
ontological adequacy of their own autobiographies.19 Lurking on the 
other side of these ontologically protective ‘reality frameworks’ is ‘the 
prospect of being overwhelmed by anxieties that reach to the very 
roots of our coherent sense of ‘being in the world’’.20  
In the IR literature the conventional focus on ontological 
security has been on either internal processes of discursive self-
articulation of national biographies21or externally induced processes 
                                                 
16 Ronald David Laing, The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and 
Madness (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1960). 
17 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991). 
18 Ibid., 36. 
19 Stuart Croft and Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘Fit for purpose ? Fitting ontological 
security studies “into” the discipline of International Relations : Towards a 
vernacular turn’, Cooperation and Conflict 52, n.1 (2017), 5. 
20 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 37.  
21 See, for example, Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-
Identity and the IR State.  
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of identity creation and maintenance.22 It has been applied to a wide 
range of different research questions in international relations, 
including, for example, the motivations behind participation in military 
humanitarian intervention23, the reasons why states become drawn 
into unending conflictual relations24, why they create and maintain 
international institutions25 and security communities26, how trauma 
and memory are implicated in the production of international politics27 
and how/why groups develop and attach themselves to religious and 
nationalist narratives/ideologies. 28  
Jeff Huysmans, who first introduced the ontological security 
concept to critical security studies, analytically separates daily 
security from ontological security. The former relates to strategies of 
physical survival in relation to identifiable threats whereas the latter 
concerns the ability to cope with existential uncertainty ‘by fixing 
social relations into a symbolic and institutional order’ therefore 
‘making life intelligible’.29 Huysmans defines ontological security as 
an ‘ordering activity’ or one’s capacity to ‘manage indeterminacy’.30 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Jennifer Mitzen, ‘Ontological Security in World Politics: State 
Identity and the Security Dilemma’, European Journal of International Relations 
12, n. 3 (2006): 341–370. 
23 Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR 
State. 
24 Mitzen, ‘Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security 
Dilemma’. 
25 Marco Vieira, ‘Understanding Resilience in International Relations: the Non-
Aligned Movement and Ontological Security’, International Studies Review 18, n. 
2 (2016):290-311. 
26 Christopher Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, ‘From Fratricide to Security 
Community: Re-theorising Difference in the Constitution of Nordic Peace’, 
Journal of International Relations and Development, 16, n. 4 (2013), 483-513.   
27 Alexandria J. Innes and Brent Steele, ‘Memory, Trauma and Ontological 
Security’, in Memory and Trauma in International Relations: Theories, Cases, 
and Debates, eds. Erica Resende and Dovile Budryte (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2014) 15-29. 
28 Catarina Kinnvall, ‘Globalization and religion nationalism: self, identity and the 
search for ontological security’, Political Psychology 25, n. 4 (2004): 741–767, 
Brent Steele, ‘Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity: British 
Neutrality and the American Civil War’,  Review of International Studies 31, n. 3 
(2005): 519-40, Jelena Subotić, ‘Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign 
Policy Change’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 12, n. 4 (2016), 610-647. 
29Jef Huysmans, ‘Security! What Do You Mean?: From Concept to Thick 
Signifier’,  European Journal of International Relations 4, n. 2 (1998) 242. 
30 Ibid., 245. 
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In contrast with some recent ethical/political critiques of the 
concept 31, for Huysmans ontological security does not necessarily 
mean a process of closure, as a way to (often violently) exclude the 
undetermined/unfamiliar ‘Other’, but the setting up of malleable ‘life 
strategies’ to cope with existential anxiety.32 If one accepts this 
position, ontological security can also be about accepting and 
creatively accommodating difference and ambivalence. Yet as 
sensible as his approach is, Huysman’s theorisation does not 
sufficiently deal with the question of what actual function existential 
anxiety (or what he calls ‘angst’) has in the actor’s operation of 
ontological security.  
Huysmans, and the broader scholarship on ontological security, 
assumes that subjects only ‘exist’ through either single or multiple 
discursive representations of their selves that aim to demarcate the 
inside from the outside.33 However, this ontological position does not 
incorporate the mechanism of emotional identification I theorise in 
this article. As a general case, the ontological security literature has 
thus far failed to investigate the role of ‘anxiety’ as a form of 
unconscious and pre-discursive energy (or stimuli) that pulls together 
and animates the process of discursively constructing and sustaining 
one’s self-understanding. 
In this regard, by mobilising Lacan’s social-psychoanalytic 
approach, I conceptualise ‘anxiety’ as a productive emotional force 
and core psychological ingredient, even necessary condition, for 
structuring one’s subjectivity. It bears some resemblance with Brent 
Steele’s position, which acknowledges (albeit does not substantively 
engage with) ‘anxiety’ as the emotional motor of agents’ ever-
frustrated desire for ontological security. He argues that ‘anxiety 
surrounds our sense of Self; agents are never ontologically secure. 
                                                 
31 See, for example, Chris Rossdale, ‘Enclosing Critique: The Limits of 
Ontological Security’, International Political Sociology 9, n. 4 (2015): 369-386. 
32 Huysmans, ‘Security! What Do You Mean?: From Concept to Thick Signifier’, 
243.  
33 For a comprehensive overview of the latest developments in ontological 
security research in IR, see Catarina Kinnvall and Jennifer Mitzen, ‘An 
Introduction to the Special Issue: Ontological Securities in World Politics’ 
Cooperation and Conflict 52, n. 1 (2016): 3-11.   
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But they try and they constantly attempt to get to a more anchored 
position from which their decisive actions have meaning’.34 
While exploring postcolonial subjectivity in the case of Brazil, 
my contribution therefore is to theoretically develop the assumption 
that ontological security relates to an anxiety-driven, fantasised35 
construction of the Self. That is, a lack constituted by the always-
unresolved and endless pursuit of discursive master signifiers that 
would purportedly capture the subject’s core existential meaning.36 A 
sense of ‘enjoyment’ derives from this illusory promise of fullness, 
through discursive attachments to symbolic representations.37 As 
Solomon points out, according to Lacan,  
 
When the subject approaches that which it believes will make it 
role, it realizes that the imagined wholeness does not live up to 
the promise of the fantasy. That is, paradoxically, the closer the 
subject gets to enjoyment, the more desire fades and the more 
anxiety sets in, since only through desire we have subjectivity.38    
 
I suggest that the most basic psychological mechanism 
constitutive of postcolonial subjectivity relates to the anxiety 
associated with this ever-frustrated belief in (and pursuit of) a 
complete sense of selfhood. 
To further clarify these ideas, it is worth looking at how the 
subject’s anxiety-driven desire for wholeness is expressed in what 
                                                 
34 Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR 
State, 48.  
35 Lacan’s conceptual engagement with the notion of fantasy is significantly 
different from more colloquial definitions of the term.  For him, fantasy means the 
(largely discursive) frame through which the subject is able to pursue the desire 
for self-understanding (‘wholeness’) though it is never realised; hence a fantasy. 
See Solomon, The Politics of Subjectivity in American Foreign Policy Discourses, 
37. On Lacan’s notion of ‘fantasy’ and ontological security, see, also, Jakub 
Eberle, ‘Narrative, desire, ontological security, and transgression: fantasy as a 
factor in international politics’, Journal of International Relations and 
Development (online first). Available at: 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41268-017-0104-2. Last accessed 26 
June, 2017.  
36 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006).    
37 Ibid., 73. 
38 Solomon, The Politics of Subjectivity in American Foreign Policy Discourses, 
49. 
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Lacan calls the ‘imaginary’ and ‘symbolic’ dimensions of human 
subjectivity.39 The imaginary element of subjectivity relates to the 
most basic building block in the constitution of the subject’s imaginary 
identity (ego) through the identification with an idealised image of a 
superior other. As elaborated below, this psychological process of 
self-identity construction takes place in the ‘mirror-stage’ of a child’s 
development and it has profound implications on the subject’s self-
perception and engagement with the world outside of oneself.  It is in 
the imaginary dimension that the anxiety-laden lack is introduced and 
becomes the subject’s unconscious motivational force in its pursuit of 
ontological security.40   
However, this process of imaginary self-identification is played 
out and intrinsically connected to a pre-existing symbolic order from 
where subjects permanently draw the master signifiers (ideals, 
values, conventions and meanings articulated in language) they 
desire to embody, emulate and obey as a way to sustain an illusory 
sense of psychological stability. According to my Lacanian-inspired 
interpretation, this broader system of signification, anchored on the 
idea of Western civilizational and racial superiority, is the core source 
of symbolic identification that unstably sustains postcolonial states’ 
ontological security. 
These processes of self-identity creation and maintenance at 
the imaginary and symbolic levels are discursively articulated in both 
the individual and institutionalised self-narratives of postcolonial 
states and in routinised/habituated practices within the international 
institutions they have collectively created such as, for example, the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In this respect, the missing link in my 
previous work on the NAM, understood as a source of ontological 
security to its members41, was a theorisation of the emotional 
(desire/anxiety) dimension of ontological security, which binds 
together and animates collective self-identity narratives. In doing that 
here, my intention is to understand postcolonial agency in a single 
                                                 
39 Although in this article I only focus on the ‘imaginary’ and the ‘symbolic’, 
Lacan’s late theory of the subject is also centered on the dimension of the ‘real’, 
Lacan, Ecrits. For an in-depth discussion of Lacan’s subject of the ‘real’, see, for 
example, Chiesa, Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan.       
40 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).  
41 Vieira, ‘Understanding Resilience in International Relations: the Non-Aligned 
Movement and Ontological Security’. 
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case by connecting the anxiety-permeated ‘lack’ experienced by 
postcolonial states with its translation into habituated discourses and 
foreign policy practices.  
       
A Lacanian Reading of Postcolonial Subjectivity 
 
In this section, I explore the theoretical claim that postcolonial 
subjects are motivated by an unconscious and anxiety-motivated 
desire (in a Lacanian sense of the term) to imitate/replicate a ‘mirror 
image’ representing their former colonial masters. The mirror stage is 
the original instance formative of the image of the subject’s ‘I’ in 
relation to a projected and idealised ‘other’. We enter the symbolic 
order of culture, language and meaning already with an idea of an 
imaginary self that takes place in the ‘mirror stage’ of an individual’s 
psychological development.42 In my interpretation, the empirical 
substantiation of postcolonial states’ ontological security derives from 
the multiple narrative self-articulations representing and demarcating 
this ambivalent, lacking subjectivity. 
Lacanian theory also suggests that the subject is never fully 
unified into an individual ego at the ‘imaginary’ level. Instead, the 
always-illusory achievement of ontological security is dependent upon 
continuously embracing external identifications at the collective-level 
symbolic order. This means that the psychological dispositions of the 
colonised subject I discuss below are rooted in historically situated 
and wide-ranging processes of establishing and expanding a colonial 
hierarchy of power.43  
The body of postcolonial theory interested in the 
psychologically disruptive impact of colonialism/coloniality on 
individual subjects offers an appropriate entry point to my Lacanian 
approach to postcolonial ontological security.44 Homi Bhabba, for 
example, focuses on the particular ambivalent nature of postcolonial 
states’ subjectivity.45 Bhabba coined the term ‘colonial mimicry’ to 
                                                 
42 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1981). 
43 Quijano, ‘Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America’, 215-16. 
44 For an interesting distinction between postcolonial and decolonial intellectual 
practices, see, Gurminder K. Bhambra, ‘Postcolonial and Decolonial Dialogues’, 
Postcolonial Studies 17, n.2 (2014), 115–121. 
45 Homi Bhabba, The Location of Culture (London and New York: Routledge, 
2004), 122. 
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explain the postcolonial subject’s desire for a ‘reformed, recognizable 
‘other’ as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not 
quite’.46 The ambivalent/hybrid vision of the colonised self that is 
‘almost the same, but not quite’ is a ‘writing’, a form of discursive 
representation which places the postcolonial subject unstably in-
between the West and the non-West. 47 Following from this idea, one 
could argue that postcolonial states have engaged in practices of 
imitation or mimicry of their projected colonisers’ others according to 
what they considered the desired yet not fully achievable standards of 
Western modernity. This would allow them some enjoyment through 
the fantasy of discursively filling the existential lack/anxiety generated 
by colonial assimilation and acculturation. 
Franz Fanon’s theorisation of colonialism’s impact on the 
psyche of the colonised also helps to elucidate the Lacanian schema 
of the present analysis. In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon suggests 
that the subjectivity of the colonised was constructed through a 
politics of white assimilation leading to the fragmentation of the 
colonial subject. The colonised subject must wear a white mask 
whose imposition produces a deep sense of self-doubt, humiliation 
and, ultimately, ontological insecurity. Continually perceived as the 
shadow of the white coloniser, the colonial subject accepts and 
internalises a sense of inferiority.48 
In the book, Fanon reveals the trauma of (mis-)recognition he 
experienced when a white boy, startled with his presence, shouts 
‘look, a negro!’.  In his words, ‘my body was given back to me 
sprawled out, distorted, recolored, clad in mourning in that white 
winter day’.49 To mobilise my Lacanian-inspired approach, in Fanon’s 
scene, the boy’s reaction exposes the racist socio-symbolic order in 
which colonialism is built and the existential anxiety/‘lack’ it instils in 
the colonised subject by violently rendering in vain its ontological 
security-seeking attempts to embrace the desired white/western 
‘master signifiers’.  
W. E. B. Du Bois’s notion of double consciousness further 
extricates the affective mechanism of the ‘mirror image’ I propose in 
this article as way to understand postcolonial ontological security. In 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 122.  
47 Ibid., 181.  
48 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (Pluto: London, 1986).  
49 Ibid., 110-13.  
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his seminal auto-ethnographic book The Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois 
coined the concept to explicate the emotional/psychological strain 
experienced by African Americans in the late 19th and early 20th 
century, including his own, of feeling as if their identities were split 
between ‘white American’ and ‘black African’ signifiers. Du Bois 
defines ‘double consciousness’ as ‘a peculiar sensation […] this 
sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, […] 
of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity’.50 
For the black subject, the white other serves to define 
everything that the self desires, yet, in the process, empties the 
original signifier of blackness. The irreconcilable distance between 
these two opposed imagined selves generates unsettling anxiety, and 
even trauma, such as in the experience described above in Fanon’s 
encounter with a white child. This anxiety-laden desire for the ‘racial 
identity’ of the colonial master is embedded in the social-symbolic 
order of (post-)coloniality or, in Du Bois words, in the ‘colour-line’ 
organising principle of global relations.51 In this sense, racism, as a 
global and hegemonic system of social and political practice, has 
enabled the deformation, splitting and even destruction of pre-colonial 
self-conceptions given the negative assumptions and open hostility of 
the coloniser towards their biology and culture. 
Ashis Nandy’s focus on the historicity of postcolonial 
consciousness offers further analytical purchase to my Lacanian 
approach to postcolonial ontological security. For him, cultural 
ethnocentrism and the racist worldview that underlies Western 
colonialism survived after postcolonial states’ political independence 
in the ‘minds of men’, in terms of the widespread internalisation, 
among both coloniser and colonised, of what the author calls the 
adult-child paradigm.52 From the perspective of the theoretical 
approach offered here, this historically situated process in the 
development of postcolonial states’ subjectivity can be understood in 
terms of an early ‘mirror image’ encounter between the colonised’s 
                                                 
50 W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New York, Avenel, NJ: Gramercy 
Books, 1994), 44. 
51 W. E. B. Du Bois (ed. Nahum Dimitri Chandler), The Problem of the Color Line 
at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: the Essential Early Essays (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2015), 111-15.   
52 Ashis Nandy, ‘The Psychology of Colonialism: Sex, Age, and Ideology in 
British India’, Psychiatry 45, n. 3 (1982), 201.  
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still unformed ‘ego’ and the coloniser’s ‘alter’. Through the encounter, 
the postcolonial subject incorporated European colonial attitudes 
whereby the colonised is not seen as an individual autonomous and 
functional entity but represented as, for example, a collective 
uncivilised mass53 or a child in a very early stage of cognitive 
development54. This means that the historical practices of European 
colonialism resulted in the global production and representation of 
colonised subjects as Europe’s exotic, inferior, silenced and subaltern 
others.55 
By engaging with the notion of ‘coloniality’, Anibal Quijano also 
locates the psychological outlook of the former colonised peoples in 
the ‘symbolic order’, as a product of Western colonialism. According 
to him, ‘there was produced a new mental category to codify the 
relations between conquering and conquered populations: the idea of 
‘race’, as biologically structural and hierarchical differences between 
the dominant and the dominated’.56 In this sense, the postcolonial 
subject is the discursive reflexion of opposed and unstably connected 
West/non-West identity signifiers. 
Notwithstanding clear differences in their accounts of the 
postcolonial subjects’ psychological contours, these authors have 
identified and conceptualised the existential lack, and ensuing 
anxiety, resulting from the postcolonial subjects’ original mirror 
identification with an alleged superior coloniser other and their 
associated self-assigned inferior location in the symbolic order of 
(post-)coloniality.  
Through the above-discussed mechanism of affective 
identification-imitation, traversing the imaginary and symbolic 
dimensions of postcolonial subjectivities, I argued in this section that 
postcolonial ontological security refers to subjects’ anxiety-driven 
                                                 
53 Jabri, The Postcolonial Subject: Claiming Politics/Governing Others in Late 
Modernity, 14.  
54 Nandy, ‘The Psychology of Colonialism: Sex, Age, and Ideology in British 
India’, Psychiatry, 203.  
55 See, for example, Geeta Chowdhry and Nair Sheila Nair, Power, 
Postcolonialism and International Relations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), 
Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin Books, 2003), and Gayatri C. 
Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, in Marxism and the interpretation of Culture, 
eds. C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1988).  
56 Quijano, ‘Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America’, 216.  
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management of an existential lack. In the following discussion, I 
contend that ontological security-seeking processes of self-
identification with the coloniser other at the imaginary and symbolic 
levels have been articulated into national autobiographical narratives 
and incorporated into durable and habituated foreign policy practices 
of the Brazilian state. As demonstrated next, in the case of Brazil, my 
Lacanian approach to postcolonial ontological security allows for the 
productive examination of foreign policy discourses and practices 
since the acquisition of independent nationhood. 
 
Sources of Brazil’s ‘Self’  
 
In this section, I examine Brazil’s most salient national self-
conceptions, which have been discursively articulated by domestic 
political actors from political independence in 1822 to the period of 
Lula da Silva’s two terms in office from 2003 to 2010. What I call 
national self-conceptions are the elite-driven intellectual processes of 
discursively articulating and institutionalising Brazil’s postcolonial 
national identity. The transposition of the state’s dominant self-
conceptions into foreign policy narratives is conceptualised here in 
Lacanian terms as a useful fantasy created to cope with the ‘lack’ 
generated in the diplomatic elites by Brazil’s perceived inferior 
civilizational position in the socio-symbolic order it had just entered as 
an independent postcolonial state. 
Drawing from the previous theoretical discussion, I empirically 
investigate Brazil’s ambivalent discursive articulations of ‘racial 
hybridity’ as a core master signifier underpinning the state’s national 
psyche. According to the argument put forth here, these are 
temporally-situated ontological security-seeking moves to 
accommodate elites’ anxieties over Brazil’s self-inflicted status as an 
‘inferior other’. I claim that this is originated in the ‘mirror-stage’ 
imaginary dimension of Brazil’s emergence as a postcolonial subject. 
Yet, Brazil’s discursive sources of self-identification, in relation to its 
always-incomplete pursuit of Western civilizational standards, are 
drawn from the broader symbolic order of Western postcoloniality. In 
this sense, my Lacanian-inspired ontological security framework 
interrogates the emotional-psychological aspects of Brazil’s foreign 
policy making. It therefore contributes to a more comprehensive 
understanding of how anxiety-led processes of self-identity 
construction are linked to, for example, Brazil’s long-term association 
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with Portuguese colonialism, its reluctance to join the NAM, and later 
-- with Lula da Silva -- Brazil’s focus on closer cooperation with non-
Western states, particularly in Africa.                  
In what follows, I address three distinctive historical junctions of 
Brazil’s ‘lack’. I firstly present negative hybridity as the original 
discursive articulation of Brazil’s postcolonial ego in the process of 
entering the symbolic order. The point here is that the Eurocentric 
order of the 19th century enabled the manifestation in Brazilian elites 
of a sense of existential anxiety/insecurity associated with their 
country’s perceived peripheral position in the racial hierarchy of 
international relations. I then historically detail versions of positive 
hybridity, which were dominant in Brazil for most of the 20th century, 
as a response to structural changes in the symbolic order of 
coloniality. This is followed by the examination of Lula da Silva’s 
fundamental psychological reckoning with Brazil’s anxious and 
lacking Self in the early 21st century. The discursive representation of 
Brazil’s lack shifts here from the previous fantasised view of Brazil as 
a racially mixed and tolerant nation to the open acknowledgement of 
racial inequalities in the country and the foregrounding in foreign and 
domestic political discourses of Brazil’s black/African identity 
markers.      
 
From negative to positive hybridity: understanding Brazil’s narrated 
‘self’  
     
During the 19th and early 20th centuries, Brazilian social thinkers, 
largely under the influence of theories of ‘scientific racism’, 
interpreted the impact of Portuguese colonialism on Brazil’s national 
ethos in highly negative terms; as an incomplete, racially inferior and 
unfinished example of Western modernity. They promoted the racial 
whitening of Brazil’s degenerated mixed race population through 
large scale white European immigration as a solution to the problem 
of Brazil’s backwardness.57 
Interestingly, these authors’ skeptical assessment of Brazil as a 
racially impracticable nation reveals a particular attempt to represent 
a lack; in terms of their understanding of Brazil’s postcolonial 
                                                 
57 See, for exemple, Nina Rodrigues, As Collectividades Anormaes (Rio de 
Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1939) and Francisco José de Oliveira Vianna, 
Raça e Assimilação (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938).  
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condition as a permanently frustrated desire for a Western signifier 
that they wish to embrace as their own but which is never fully 
achievable. However, the focus of the desired other is not the former 
coloniser, Portugal, but towards more advanced representations of 
Western culture and race. Indeed, for many classic Brazilian thinkers, 
Brazil’s backwardness was the historical effect of having had a 
coloniser itself racially mixed and in the periphery of Western 
modernity.58 
The sense of inferiority generated by a permanently frustrated 
desire to reproduce Western cultural attitudes and racial 
physiognomies shaped diplomatic attitudes in the early history of 
independent Brazil. The 19th century’s diplomatic intelligentsia 
envisaged Brazil’s future through the ‘mirror image’ of the Western 
European (France and Britain, in particular) and, increasingly, North-
American civilizations.59 From independence to the initial decades of 
the 20th century, successive Brazilian intellectuals and foreign policy 
makers displayed an unmitigated reverence towards Europe and then 
the United States, as the desired ‘masters signifiers’ of Brazil’s 
‘incomplete’ Self. 60  
Joaquim Nabuco, prominent Brazilian intellectual and Brazil’s 
first Ambassador to the United States in 1905, actively promoted the 
abolition of slavery and its replacement by European migration as a 
way ‘to bring to the tropics a Caucasian blood stream that is 
vivacious, energetic and healthy so that we can absorb it here’.61 As 
one of the key designers of Brazil’s modern diplomacy, Nabuco 
envisaged a foreign policy centred on close cooperation with the 
                                                 
58 Sérgio Tavolaro criticises this body of intellectual work for relegating Brazil to a 
position of ‘semi-modern limbo’ and essentialised ‘peripherality’, Sergio Tavolaro 
(2005) ‘Existe uma Modernidade Brasileira? Reflexões em Torno de um Dilema 
Sociológico Brasileiro’ Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 20, n. 5 (2005), 22. 
59 Leslie Bethell, ‘Nabuco e o Brasil entre Europa, Estados Unidos e America 
Latina’, Novos Estudos, 88 (2010), 73-87.   
60 Brazil’s nationalisation as an imagined community has been the result of the 
gradual, albeit forceful, imposition of a totalising set of identity signifiers upon 
other domestic groups whose national identity claims were made invisible. For 
more on this, see, Laura Lima, Worlding Brazil: Intellectuals, Identity and Security 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2015). On the notions of ‘nationalisation’ and ‘imagined 
communities’, see, respectively, Quijano, ‘Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism 
in Latin America’ and Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London and 
New York: Verso, 2006).  
61 Nabuco cited in Lima, Worlding Brazil: Intellectuals, Identity and Security, 32.  
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perceived main beneficiary of European modernity, the United States, 
which he described as an ‘immense moral influence in the march of 
civilization’.62 
Similarly, José Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr., the Baron of Rio 
Branco, Brazil’s Foreign Minister from 1902 to 1912, promoted an 
‘unwritten alliance’63 with Washington, but also acknowledged that 
was ‘[Europe] who created us, who taught us; from her we 
relentlessly received support and example, the clarity of science and 
arts, the commodities of industry and lessons of progress’.64 The 
imaginary dimension of Brazil’s subjectivity is displayed by Rio 
Branco’s mirror-image approach towards his choice of diplomatic 
appointees abroad. Thomas Skidmore notes that ‘as foreign minister, 
he followed a ‘white only’ policy in recruiting diplomats…he preferred 
the tall, blond, handsome types such as Joaquim Nabuco’.65 
In relation to the symbolic order register of subjectivity, it is 
interesting to note that, prior to taking up the role of foreign minister, 
Rio Branco had spent almost thirty years in the racially conscious 
Europe of the late 19th century where, as Brazil’s highest 
representative, he experienced and absorbed first hand the dominant 
pseudo-scientific theories of white racial superiority. The legacy of 
this anxiety-driven interpretation of Brazil’s inferior status vis-à-vis the 
West has had profound and lasting socio-psychological implications 
for its self-understanding as an independent political community. 
The global financial crash of the 1930s, followed by the 
devastation of the Second World War, which fundamentally shook the 
symbolic order of coloniality, triggered the psychological need to re-
accommodate Brazilian elites’ fantasied identification with their ideal 
Western other. In this sense, Brazil’s desire to find symbolic 
identifications as a way to manage existential anxiety, hence 
                                                 
62 Nabuco cited in Tereza M. Dulci, O Pan-Americanism de Joaquim Nabuco e 
Oliveira Lima (paper presented at the VII Annual Meeting of the National 
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ontological security, was channeled through the discursive 
construction of Portuguese colonialism as a positive and unique 
symbol of Western modernity. 
The Brazilian writer, Gilberto Freyre, particularly his 1933 book 
Casa Grande e Senzala (The Masters and the Slaves), was the most 
powerful intellectual conduit for this new interpretation of Brazil’s self-
identity.66 Freyre’s theory of lusotropicalismo postulates that Brazil’s 
experience with Portuguese colonialism, largely in relation to 
Portugal’s unique aptitude to cultural integration and racial 
miscegenation, created in Brazil ‘another West’, ‘different and better 
than Europe and the United States’.67 
This paradigm was further reinforced by the publication of 
Sergio Buarque de Holanda’s Raízes do Brazil (Roots of Brazil), in 
1936. Holanda coined the notion of homem cordial (cordial man) to 
claim that Brazil’s national psychology is based on particular 
coexistence norms related to cordiality among different social and 
ethnic/racial groups.68 Lima observes that Freyre’s and Holanda’s 
ideas ‘provided a solution to the racial conundrum that had pervaded 
social theorizing in the previous decades’.69 
From the early 1950s, leading Brazilian foreign policy elites 
incorporated into foreign policy thinking the positive hybridity national 
ethos initiated by Freyre and Holanda. This was reflected upon, for 
example, sympathetic views and actual political support towards 
Portuguese colonialism in Africa. Brazilian diplomats discursively 
articulated a Freyre-inspired ideology of lusotropicalismo grounded 
on a fantasised myth of Brazil as a successful early example of 
Portugal’s benign form of colonialism.70 Unlike previous 
interpretations of Portugal’s colonial backwardness, Brazil is now 
presented as a successful and unique experiment with ‘racial 
democracy’, in contrast with the Anglo-Saxon model of ‘superiority 
based on skin pigmentation’.71 
                                                 
66Jerry Dávila, Hotel Trópico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization  
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67 Ibid., 13.  
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In the context of the Cold War, the master signifier of Brazil’s 
anxiety-driven lack is expressed in terms of using lusotropicalismo to 
assert a unique Western/Iberian identity that set Brazil closer to an 
idealised, even superior, Western other and further apart from other 
Asian and African postcolonial states.72 In other words, the desire to 
be recognised as a distinct member of the select group of Western 
states is expressed through Brazilian diplomatic elites’ mystified idea 
of Brazil’s unique contribution to modernity as a result of its 
Portuguese colonial heritage based on racial tolerance. From the 
early 1960s, with decolonisation ideas gaining pace in Asia and 
Africa, Brazil sought closer relations with other Third World states, 
particularly in Africa. However, notwithstanding the emergence of 
competing discursive articulations of Brazil’s desired place in the 
emerging Third World symbolic order, Brazilian diplomatic elites were 
still firmly committed to the idea of Brazil’s postcolonial 
exceptionalism. 
Remarkably, Brazil has never joined the most emblematic Third 
World institution: the NAM, officially established in 1961. The 
symbolic structure of normative ideas, which I argue elsewhere73, 
provided NAM members with a sense of belonging and ontological 
security, in the otherwise anxiety-charged international environment 
of the Cold War, failed to attract and re-shape, to the same extent, 
Brazil’s postcolonial self. Rather than fully embracing either Third 
World/black or Western/white signifiers, Brazil’s ‘fantasised’ self-
narrative of a mixed race and tolerant nation swayed its foreign policy 
to a different role, as a ‘bridge’ between, what former Brazilian foreign 
minister Afonso Arinos described in 1965, as a ‘racial curtain’ 
separating the West and the Third World.74 
                                                 
72 During the Asia-Africa Bandung Conference of 1955, the main precursor of the 
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Under authoritarian rule, in the 1970s, ruling foreign policy 
elites’ identification with the ‘master signifier’ of lusotropicalismo led 
to the increasingly awkward position of the no longer sustainable 
defence of Portuguese colonialism in Africa. This was clear during the 
month-long visit of the Brazilian foreign Minister, Mario Gibson 
Barboza, to the continent in late 1971, when his anti-colonial rhetoric, 
primarily aimed at winning over potential economic partners, 
generally fell on deaf ears as a result of African leaders’ suspicions 
over Brazil’s warm relations with Portugal and Apartheid South 
Africa.75 In keeping with my Lacanian approach, this period in Brazil’s 
process of managing its postcolonial ontological security is 
epitomised by the growing inconsistency between Brazil’s desired 
positive hybridity self-identification as ‘another West’ and the 
consolidating de-colonial symbolic order of the 1960s/70s.     
In terms of early post-Cold War diplomatic narratives, Brazil re-
articulated and adapted the meaning of ‘positive hybridity’ signifiers to 
the emerging Western-led symbolic order that followed the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the waning of the Third World movement 
from the 1980s. The new foreign policy language of autonomy 
through participation denoted Brazil’s distinctive capacity to build trust 
relationships as an important diplomatic asset while facilitating the 
implementation of the standards and processes set by the Western 
powers and their institutions. In this regard, Brazil’s accession to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1998, following thirty years 
of consistently denouncing it as an unacceptable attempt to further 
institutionalise the Cold War’s power structure76, was one of the most 
important symbols of Brazil’s reformed process of identification with 
the signifiers of the newly reconstituted Western-liberal symbolic 
order.  
I argued above that, following independence from Portugal in 
1822, Brazil’s quest for ontological security should be understood as 
intrinsically connected with political elites’ attempts to discursively 
accommodate/stabilise the anxiety-laden ‘lack’ generated by their 
perceived inferior status vis-à-vis the West. These narrated fantasies 
around the myth of postcolonial racial/cultural hybridity, which have 
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over the decades produced an illusory, albeit necessary, sense of 
ontological security, have shaped Brazil’s self-perception and 
resulting foreign policy ideas.                      
 
Positive hybridity as a reconstituted ‘master signifier’  
 
In 2003, the election of Luis Inácio (Lula) da Silva heralded a drastic 
discontinuity in Brazil’s pattern of rule by privileged, often Western 
educated, political elites. I argue in the remainder of this article that, 
in this new political environment, Brazil, for the first time since 
independence, confronted and deliberately tried to overcome the 
residual affective heritance of its frustrated pursuit of a mirror-image 
self-perception in relation to Western civilizational/racial standards.  
Under Da Silva’s administration, Brazil deliberately recast early 
enunciations of positive hybridity by attempting to shed the element of 
mimicry of Western models, which have characterised previous 
interpretations of Brazil’s role and positions in international relations. 
Rather than the former fantasised description of Brazil as a unique 
example of Western, racially mixed and tolerant democracy, Da Silva 
moved the focus to Brazil’s hybrid, even though largely non-Western, 
black/African, identity signifiers. He acknowledged Brazil’s close and 
constitutive links with Western civilization, yet proposed a new 
attitude based on solidarity with other postcolonial states, particularly 
in Africa. During a tour of Southern African states, in January 2004, 
Da Silva stated in the Mozambican capital, Maputo, that,  
 
Brazilian society was built on the work, the sweat and the blood 
of Africans, the millions of slaves who were brought to Brazil 
between the 16th and 19th centuries. For that reason, Brazil is in 
debt to Africa – a debt which the country intends to repay by 
strengthening its solidarity and cooperation.77  
 
 In his second inauguration speech, in 2007, Da Silva affirmed 
that Africa was one of the cradles of Brazilian civilization and pointed 
to historical racial inequality at home as one of his top policy 
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priorities.78 Da Silva’s message evokes a strong emotional reckoning 
of Brazil’s historical experience with blackness through slavery. In this 
respect, Yvonne Captain observes that with Da Silva ‘the dialogue 
changed from one of the now-discredited concept of racial democracy 
to one of racial healing’.79 Da Silva’s Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, 
who led 60 high-profile missions to Africa, visiting over 40 countries, 
also articulated a narrative that portrayed Brazil as a predominantly 
black nation, ‘with 76 million Afro-descendants, we are the second 
largest black nation in the world, behind Nigeria, and the government 
is committed to reflect this reality in its foreign actions’.80  
Fanon’s and Lacan’s insights are useful in understanding Da 
Silva’s attempt to fundamentally confront and reconstitute Brazil’s 
postcolonial subjectivity.81 For both, the subject’s potential for self-
creation and agency is found in the space in-between the dominant 
system of symbolic representations and the incomplete/distorted 
nature of individual postcolonial subjects.82 The colonised subject for 
Fanon is rooted in, albeit never fully determined by its initial condition 
of wearing a white mask, as a way to have his/her humanity 
recognised by the coloniser other. Similarly, Lacan’s foundational lack 
is based on the idea that since the subject is unable to ever construct 
itself fully, there is always a continuous desire for its re-articulation in 
the ever-present void between the idealised image and its unfulfilled 
realisation.83 Drawing on these ideas, I suggest that, unlike the 
previous periods examined here, Da Silva redirected Brazil’s anxiety-
generated desire for symbolic identifications to the discursive space 
of Brazil’s non-Western African other. 
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At the imaginary dimension, Da Silva embodies the previously 
examined postcolonial outlook of the inferior other; a former shoe-
shine boy and street vendor, coming from the neglected backlands of 
Brazil’s Northeast, who, nonetheless, managed to reach the country’s 
highest political office. It is reasonable to expect that Da Silva’s 
unique personal experience with successfully breaking free from 
longstanding stereotypical views in Brazilian society triggered a 
psychological process of deep existential contestation of Brazil’s 
mirror-image representations of Western/white superiority. At the 
symbolic level, Da Silva’s reconfigured desire for non-
Western/African signifiers converged with and was reinforced by the 
re-emergence of the Third World symbolic order (now rebranded as 
the Global South) that followed the breakdown of the Western liberal 
consensus of the 1990s.84 
This process of re-signification was reproduced into the official 
foreign policy positions and narratives of the Brazilian state. This was 
the case, for example, in the intensification and expansion of 
development cooperation activities, the transfer of financial resources 
and technology, and the government’s emphasis on the international 
communication and diffusion of Brazil’s social welfare programmes, 
such as the Bolsa Família (Family Grant) and Fome Zero (Zero 
Hunger).85 Abdenur and Neto argue that in Africa, particularly in 
Portuguese speaking countries, ‘Brazil presented itself as a more 
sincere partner for cooperation development, devoid of the colonial 
legacies of Northern aid’.86  
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Strategy: Role Conception and the Drive for International Status (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2015). 
86 Adriana Abdenur and Danilo M. Neto, ‘Brazil’s Growing Relevance to Peace 
and Security in Africa’, NOREF Report (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Peacebuilding 
Resource Centre, 2014), 3.    
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It is fair to say that, by assuming Brazil’s superior knowledge in 
areas such as tropical agriculture and social welfare, Da Silva’s 
approach has largely replicated the colonial overconfidence of 
Western modernisation models. Nevertheless, it is significant to the 
argument developed here that his reformed vocabulary provided an 
innovative reinterpretation of Brazil’s unique experience with nation-
building in relation to, yet fundamentally distinguishable from Western 
models. Da Silva’s reformed self-narrative was predicated on the 
psychologically very difficult task of overcoming hierarchical racial 
categorisations of ‘self’ and ‘other’ that have fundamentally shaped 
the Brazilian national psyche since independence. In this sense, Da 
Silva and Amorim tried to overcome deeply institutionalised 
diplomatic discourses and practices by focusing on healing Brazil’s 
sense of inferiority. In 2010, at the end of Da Silva’s second term in 
office, Amorim claimed that a ‘profound transformation in the national 
collective psychology is underway […] This is a far cry from the self-
demeaning mind-set that was so common in Brazil’.87 
One interesting symbol of Da Silva’s attempted re-signification 
of race was with regards to the question of Quilombos in Brazil. 
These were settlements of fugitive African slaves in the hinterlands of 
Brazil who actively resisted Portuguese colonial rule. In Brazil, 
Quilombos have generally been excluded from official images of what 
Brazil would like to be identified with. Rather, they have generally 
been associated with negative racial/social stereotypes and poverty, 
which were diametrically opposed to Brazilian elites’ desired 
standards of white/Western modernity. Under Da Silva, however, the 
remnants of Quilombo communities were for the first time revered as 
national treasures and legislation put in place to acknowledge the 
government’s responsibility to protect their land rights and cultural 
heritage.88  
From 2011, Dilma Rousseff, Da Silva’s chosen successor, 
carried on, even though much less enthusiastically, the process set in 
motion in the previous administration of reconstructing Brazil’s self-
perception in terms of a master signifier associated with its non-
Western African roots. In 2015, her foreign minister, Mauro Vieira, 
                                                 
87 Celso Amorim, ‘Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): An 
Overview’. Revista Brasileira de Poliítica Internacional, 53, special issue (2010), 
239. 
88 Captain, ‘Brazil’s Africa Policy under Lula’, 191. 
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observed that ‘the relevance of Africa is a defining and unavoidable 
element for Brazil. Our country is inconceivable without the African 
heritage, which is a source of pride and core foundation for the 
construction of a fairer future’.89 Under much more constrained 
economic conditions, however, Rousseff had to contend with 
renewed political opposition coming from conservative elites largely 
associated with the previously discussed negative/positive hybridity 
vision of Brazil’s self-image.90   
I argued in this section that, under Da Silva’s leadership, 
Brazil’s self-image became associated with overcoming the historical 
anxiety emanating from discursive articulations of hybridity’ as 
signifiers of an illusory desire of being of the West. It was done 
through discursively refocusing Brazil’s positive hybridity as a 
diplomatic asset, which allows Brazil to ‘pursue dialogue with 
countries of all regions, creeds, colours and backgrounds’.91 
However, unlike the previous periods analysed in this article, the 
main focus of identification is not any longer the West, seen as a 
mirror image of a desired other, but a reconstructed signifier of 
Brazil’s hybrid, albeit largely non-Western African Self. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The question of how states create and reproduce national self-
identifications has been given substantial attention in the discipline of 
International Relations (IR). In particular, the ontological security 
literature has usefully offered various interpretations of the 
psychological strategies individuals, societies and states adopt to 
pursue a stable sense of who they are. However, this scholarship, as 
well as the broader social constructivist IR literature, has thus far 
                                                 
89 Mauro Vieira, ‘Discurso do Ministro das Relações Exteriores durante almoço 
com Embaixadores do Grupo Africano residentes em Brasília - Brasília, 20 de 
março de 2015. Available at http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/. Last accessed July 11, 
2017.  
90 It is not in the analytical scope of this article to cover the current period of 
Brazil’s foreign policy, suffice to say that in 2016, following Rousseff’s 
impeachment, the new interim administration of Michel Temer, has drastically 
reversed the direction of Lula’s and Rousseff’s foreign policy by pursuing a 
realignment with traditional Western partners in Europe and the US.  
91 Amorim, ‘Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): An 
Overview’, 207. 
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failed to fully understand the key role of anxiety in animating 
ontological security practices of states’ political elites. This omission 
is most noticeable if one wants to apply the concept to empirically 
grasp processes of national self-identification in the context of 
postcolonial societies which have undergone the emotional trauma of 
colonial subjugation, particularly with regards to racial stigmatisation.                
Building on Lacan’s approach to subjectivity, in this article I 
have attempted to fill this important gap by examining the theoretical 
proposition that postcolonial ontological security is the representation 
of an anxiety-driven lack. In other words, it is an always-incomplete 
and partial form of self-identification that is periodically challenged, 
renegotiated and reinscribed. I have focused on anxiety as the core 
emotional force continuously driving subjects towards discursive 
master signifiers that would provide an illusory cover to their original 
lack. In this sense, I have argued that a fantasised form of ontological 
security is established when the anxious and the narrated selves 
coalesce into a functional, albeit always incomplete, subject. 
I have then engaged with the postcolonial psychology literature 
as a way to extricate Lacan’s mechanism of the mirror image in the 
construction of postcolonial subjectivity and how it has been reflected 
upon the ‘symbolic order’ of Western post-coloniality. The key point of 
interest here was to examine scholarly interpretations of how the 
anxiety and trauma associated with the unachievable 
mimicry/imitation of the white/western other has most fundamentally 
demarcated the postcolonial subjects’ existential lack. This condition 
was also reproduced in the broader symbolic order through the 
colonial codification of the world according to hierarchical definitions 
centred on European modernity as the highest referential of human 
development. This led to the postcolonial subjects’ anxiety-driven 
desire to constantly assign to themselves discursive meaning 
according to largely unattainable standards of Western modernity. 
Informed by the earlier theoretical discussion, I have them 
moved to the historical interpretation of Brazil’s lack. The case of 
Brazil has offered an interesting example of postcolonial ontological 
security whereby intellectuals and political elites have discursively 
inscribed Brazil’s self-images in terms of historically situated 
narratives of negative and positive racial hybridity, which 
conventionally favoured Western civilizational standards. I have 
discussed how some core signifiers of Brazil’s socio-racial makeup as 
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a mixed race hybrid entity have been translated into foreign policy 
narratives and practices. 
As a way to methodologically align the Brazilian case with my 
ontological security framework, I have empirically demarcated 
transitions in the dynamic discursive trajectory of Brazil’s self-
narratives from its early years following independence in 1822 to Da 
Silva’s administration, from 2003 to 2010. This strategy has entailed a 
conceptually consistent analysis of discursive practices that produced 
and reproduced interpretations of Brazil’s ‘lack’. These have been 
conceptualised as: 
 
(1) A lack that has been discursively inscribed as a 
negative interpretation of Brazil’s hybridity (1822-
1930s); here my focus was on the elites’ core master 
signifier of Western modernity and the interpretation 
of Brazil’s alleged unviability as a civilised nation 
given its racially mixed constitution;  
(2) A lack that has been discursively inscribed as a 
positive interpretation of Brazil’s hybridity (1930s-
2000s); this phase of Brazil’s process of self-
identification was marked by elites’ positive 
interpretation of Brazil’s ‘lusotropical’ specificity, yet it 
was still centred on the ‘desire’ to be of the West, 
even if different or even better than conventional 
Western civilizational standards; and, finally, 
(3) The attempt by Da Silva’s administration to 
fundamentally challenge and reconstitute Brazil’s lack 
in terms of reforming positive hybridity signifiers along 
the lines of Brazil’s non-Western, principally African 
origins (2003-2010).  
 
By looking at the case of Brazil, I have argued that the 
emotionally-driven process of sustaining postcolonial ontological 
security cannot be fully understood without the empirical examination 
of the subject’s discursive responses to residual yet active legacies of 
colonial past experiences defined in this article in terms of the mirror 
stage moment of a subject’s ‘coming-into-being’. The examination of 
Da Silva’s two terms in office has also highlighted that the subject’s 
continuous anxiety, while pursuing ontological security through 
emulating an ideal-West other, can be actively confronted. This points 
30 
 
to an interesting, yet underexplored, example of some political actors’ 
capacity to deliberately reflect upon and alter the innermost features 
of their states’ subjectivity, which have historically constituted foreign 
policy institutions and practices. 
Notwithstanding the specificities of the Brazilian case, I believe 
the novel theoretical insights I have offered here could work as 
valuable analytical tools in future research projects probing the 
foreign policy behaviour of other postcolonial and non-Western 
states. This article’s theoretical model could also productively 
contribute to current critical debates around whether ontological 
security necessarily entails a process of violent closure by dominant 
political elites of opposing self-conceptions.92 It could be done, for 
example, by using the notion of the anxious/lacking subject as an 
important psychological cue to interrogate the often conflictual politics 
of ontological security practices among social fields and agents 
beyond, albeit in relation to, state-originated sources of self-
identification.   
 
 
                                                 
92 See, for example, Rossdale, ‘Enclosing Critique: The Limits of Ontological 
Security’. 
